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D
uring his tenure, former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan stressed time and again that the principle of
state sovereignty cannot be used as a shield for human
rights abuses.1 Over time, lawyers, diplomats, elected
officials, and civil societies have influenced the legal and moral
foundations of the traditional concept of State sovereignty, seeking
to foreclose this legal defense for domestic violations. Indeed it is
now generally accepted that the United Nations Security Council
(Security Council) can authorize forceful humanitarian interven-
tion under its Chapter VII powers when it determines that wide-
spread domestic human rights abuses are a threat to international
peace and security.2
Within this context, the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine
(commonly referred to as R2P) emerged as a means to locate an
appropriate legal balance between state sovereignty and human
rights. Only recently formulated, the R2P doctrine seeks to ensure
that states respond to the human needs of people within their ter-
ritory or under their control, and to codify international responsi-
bility to protect a state’s citizens in the event the state fails to ful-
fill its domestic obligations. In doing so, the R2P doctrine makes
considerable contributions to defining state responsibilities under
both human rights and international law.
This article provides a brief but crucial discussion of the R2P
doctrine, its application to the conflict in Darfur, and suggestions
for strengthening its implementation. As legally correct and
morally compelling as humanitarian intervention is under the R2P
doctrine, the ongoing crisis in Darfur demonstrates that state sov-
ereignty can still trump human rights with little resulting conse-
quence for the offending state. Darfur is one of the first situations
where the media and diplomatic communities have invoked R2P,
yet the subsequent actions and threats made pursuant to this doc-
trine have been largely ignored and rebuked by the Sudanese gov-
ernment. This first test of R2P reveals that the responsibility to
protect remains an embryonic doctrine that is by no means self-
executing and, at present, lacks the dexterity to overcome real
world politics. But the R2P doctrine should not be seen as a fail-
ure. Like much of contemporary international law it needs time to
evolve to achieve its maximum potential. Diplomats and politi-
cians must learn how to use the doctrine, work towards its realiza-
tion, and recognize the benefits it can produce in terms of conflict
prevention and stability.
The Responsibility to Protect
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine emerged primarily
from two reports. The first was issued in 2001 by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), enti-
tled The Responsibility to Protect.3 The Commission authored the
report in response to concerns raised over humanitarian interven-
tions in the 1990s.4 The second report was commissioned by the
UN in 2004 and authored by a high-level panel. Entitled, A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,5 it spoke of fashioning a
“collective security” that guards people, regardless of their location,
against poverty, infectious diseases, environmental degradation,
inter-State conflict, internal conflict, terrorism, transnational
organized crime, and nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biologi-
cal weapons. The two reports joined the company of previous pro-
posals that outlined parameters for humanitarian intervention pur-
suant to Security Council authorization or unilateral state action.6
Significantly, R2P reflects the ongoing transformation of tra-
ditional international law norms by enabling international law to
address a moral imperative regardless of international borders.
Traditionally, international law only regulated interstate interac-
tion, preserving a state’s sovereignty over domestic affairs.
Increasingly, however, international law places greater responsibil-
ity on states with respect to the rights of citizens and even those
outside a state’s territory and control. 
The two reports go so far as to claim that “the responsibility
to protect” is “emerging” as a principle of customary international
law.7 The UN report urges the five permanent Security Council
members not to use their veto powers against proposed humanitar-
ian intervention8 and endorses “the emerging norm that there is a
collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the
Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort,
in the event of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleans-
ing or serious violations of international humanitarian law [where]
sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to pre-
26
Ensuring a Responsibility to Protect:
Lessons from Darfur
by Anonymous*
* The author has worked in Sudan on the Darfur conflict since mid-2005. The
author, who is not a Sudanese national, prefers to maintain anonymity due to the gov-
ernment’s sanctioning of individuals in Sudan who speak and write publicly about
Darfur. The author has an LL.M. in International Human Rights Law and a B.A. in
Political Science.
Members of the Ambororo tribe in south Darfur awaiting 
transport and resettlement in the Blue Nile State
©
 U
N
 P
ho
to
/T
im
 M
cK
ul
ka
vent.”9 The ICISS report uses similar language when describing
humanitarian interventions.10
Genocide, the two reports make clear, is not the only situa-
tion that merits humanitarian intervention. This is in keeping with
previous instances where the Security Council authorized human-
itarian intervention and corrects the common misconception that
humanitarian intervention should only occur if there is genocide.
An expert on Africa at the Royal Institute of International Affairs
(RIIA) in London correctly noted in early 2005 that over-empha-
sis on labeling the conflict in Darfur as genocide has “distracted
from taking measures to actually stop the fighting.”11
R2P also attempts to ease the concern that emerged after
NATO’s 1999 unilateral humanitarian intervention in Kosovo,
which lacked Security Council authorization. The ICISS and UN
reports stressed that the Council is the best place to deal with issues
of international peace and security, and therefore holds the respon-
sibility of authorizing humanitarian intervention. Neither report
advocates the establishment of a right of unilateral humanitarian
intervention,12 reserving intervention as a last resort when “the
prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored,
with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not
have succeeded.”13 R2P provides safeguards to ensure that the pri-
mary objective of a unilateral intervention is based on humanitar-
ian concerns. The ICISS report lists specific operational principles
that aim to hold the intervening force responsible. These include:
ensuring the force has a clear and unambiguous mandate at all
times; identifying a clear and unequivocal chain of command;
appropriating adequate resources for its mandate; defining precise
rules of engagement that fit the operational concept and adhere to
fundamental principles of international humanitarian law; and
maximizing coordination with humanitarian organizations.14 Both
reports agree that proportional means should be used such that
“the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military interven-
tion should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined
human protection objective,”15 and that an intervention should
have a reasonable chance of success and not be likely to worsen the
situation.16
Finally, it is important to note that the R2P doctrine is not
simply about humanitarian intervention, but also conflict-preven-
tion and response. Indeed, humanitarian intervention is specifi-
cally categorized as an option of last resort; thus, the doctrine seeks
to ensure that a given situation never escalates to a point at which
this would be required. Recognizing this, the ICISS report pro-
vides separate sections on the “Responsibility to Prevent,” the
“Responsibility to React,” and the “Responsibility to Re-build.”17 
The Doctrine’s Failure in Darfur
The ongoing crisis in Darfur represented the first test of the
R2P doctrine. While many worked towards its application, the
continuation of violence in Darfur reveals the extent of the doc-
trine’s weaknesses.
The international community’s failure to solve the Darfur 
crisis is rooted in the age-old dilemma that plagues international
law and, by consequence, the R2P doctrine: How do you ensure
that renegade states follow the rules? The traditional tactic of
“naming and shaming” used by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, and the UN special procedures, among others, has
proved to be largely ineffective to persuade Sudan to end its abuses.
Sudan has ignored many of the strong-arm (albeit hollow) threats
of individual states such as the United States and the United
Kingdom. In this author’s view, both the UN’s and Member States’
failure to act on their threats has demonstrated to Sudan’s govern-
ment in Khartoum that it may do as it pleases without conse-
quence. In early February 2007, the U.S. revealed plans to block
increased financial transactions of Sudanese citizens and compa-
nies if Sudan continues to resist UN peacekeepers from entering
Darfur. Whether or not the U.S. will follow through on this threat
is yet to be seen. Punitive measures and other strategies imple-
mented by the international community and individual states
(e.g., Security Council resolutions calling for disarming militia,
referral of the Darfur crisis to the ICC, targeted sanctions, and
divestment campaigns) have also not tipped the scale in favor of
the Darfuris. The list of actions taken by the UN is long but they
have not yet hit their target. 
The international community and individual states have
largely failed to find an effective mix of consequences and incen-
tives to alter this equation. In simplest terms, the advantages for
Sudan to continue the war outweigh the disadvantages. Khartoum
does what it pleases and claims its sovereign right to do so.
Khartoum launched numerous major offensives against civilians
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after the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in May 2006, and has
repeatedly derailed plans for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur.
Among other things, Khartoum continued to arm militias respon-
sible for mass death, destruction, and displacement and reneged on
its numerous promises to disarm them; it expelled the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General Jan Pronk from Sudan in
October 2006; it has violated the UN-Sudan Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA), especially relating to the freedom of move-
ment of UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) personnel;18 and it
repeatedly lied about the capacity of its justice system to deal with
war crimes while rejecting the Security Council’s referral of the
Darfur crisis to the International Criminal Court.
The Sudanese government’s acquiescence to the deployment
of African Union (AU) peacekeepers appeared to be one of its most
tangible steps towards ending the conflict. But the effectiveness of
the AU’s troops continues to be undermined by a weak civilian
protection mandate and a lack of resources. In many locations the
troops are not welcomed by the displaced population, who regard
them as failing in their task to protect civilians and as too closely
aligned with the Sudanese government. There was hope that a new
peace deal signed in May 2006 would bring the conflict to a close.
But this pitted rebels who supported the deal against rebels who
did not sign on, giving the government a claim of legitimacy to
attack the non-signatories as well as civilians. 
Other initiatives the government has taken to deflect interna-
tional criticism include setting up special courts and investigative
committees to deal with conflict-related crimes, and establishing
three State Committees to focus on violence against women and
girls. These initiatives have proven to be mere window dressing. In
late 2006 the government informed the ICC’s Office of the
Prosecutor that 14 individuals had been arrested for violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights abuses.19
Though the details of these cases are not known to the author,
prior to this statement it was not apparent that the special or reg-
ular courts had addressed cases of command responsibility or that
anyone involved in the large scale attacks that defined the Darfur
conflict had been convicted. The investigatory committees have
stressed the inter-tribal dimensions of the conflict and have largely
ignored the role of the state. Sexual violence persists in Darfur, and
two of the three sexual violence committees have not operated for
much of their existence. Overall, these committees have not led to
criminal prosecutions. 
Strengthening the Responsibility 
to Protect in Darfur
The failure of R2P in Darfur is, in this author’s view, not 
due to inherent shortcomings in the doctrine. It is the product of
states and intergovernmental organizations failing to implement
the doctrine effectively. R2P’s strong legal framework offers
numerous options for states to deter serious human rights abuses
abroad. Moreover, what were traditionally seen as political deci-
sions — such as one country pressuring another country to end
atrocities — are conceptualized by the doctrine as affirmative legal
responsibilities.
As demonstrated by the ongoing Darfur crisis, finding the
right pressure points to deter atrocities is paramount to the success-
ful implementation of the R2P doctrine. It is also necessary that
the means used to halt and deter these atrocities (be it peacekeep-
ers, targeted sanctions, or ICC referrals) have international support
and investment. To ensure this, any humanitarian mission must be
based on factual, credible information and, in the case of peace-
keepers and applied sanctions, be subject to strong and transparent
oversight mechanisms to maintain credibility. The R2P doctrine
takes many of these factors into account. It requires, for example,
peacekeepers to abide by international humanitarian law and 
calls on the five permanent Security Council powers to refrain
from using their veto when humanitarian intervention is deemed
appropriate.
To effectively apply the R2P doctrine to the Darfur crisis,
there must be a ratcheting up of targeted and tangible conse-
quences for individuals and institutions responsible for the Darfur
crisis. The ICC process and the sanctions committee represent pos-
itive first steps. UN Member States must enforce the outcomes of
these processes, as required by their Security Council resolutions,
and endorse other useful strategies. Additionally, states need to
seriously pursue new inroads to place pressure on Sudan. It was a
positive sign that African states recently brushed aside Sudan’s bid
for the presidency of the January 2007 AU Summit, instead choos-
ing Ghana. This should be matched with increased pressure on
third-party countries and institutions that have influence over
Sudan, such as China or the Arab League.20 In keeping with the
R2P doctrine, the aim here would be to motivate states which,
while possessing capacity to solve threats to international peace
and security, have not yet taken sufficient action. One of the most
important steps to ending the conflict is for the international com-
munity to identify how to break the dependant relationship
between the Sudanese government and the militias. Right now that
relationship is largely based on the government providing guns,
money, land, and profit gained from raids to impoverished com-
28
“The international 
community’s failure to 
solve the Darfur crisis is
rooted in the age-old 
dilemma that plagues 
international law and, by 
consequence, the R2P 
doctrine: How do you 
ensure that renegade states 
follow the rules?”
munities in exchange for their participation in military operations
and general instability.  
As noted above, another weakness of the R2P doctrine is that
the tools currently available to give the doctrine teeth (Chapters VI
and VII on peacekeepers, targeted sanctions, ceasefire commission
reports, ICC prosecutions, and international condemnation) are
vulnerable to ill-willed manipulation of information and propa-
ganda that make solutions look like problems. Khartoum has, with
some success, portrayed UN peacekeepers as Western occupiers,
claimed that the Western media and UN officials have exaggerated
the Darfur crisis, and attempted to make troop-contributing coun-
tries more reluctant to send troops, claiming that Darfur would
become their “graveyard.”21
This vulnerability to politicization puts the legitimacy of the
R2P doctrine (which must rely on those tools) at jeopardy. It is
therefore critical to ensure that accurate information is actively and
strategically disseminated to the media, policy makers, ceasefire
commissions, and relevant UN institutions and mechanisms.
Additionally, the international community must ensure there are
ways to determine if large-scale loss of life, genocide, or other
benchmarks for intervention are in fact occurring. It seems appro-
priate that national and international human rights workers and
humanitarian workers should play a key role here, since these
actors usually have access to more credible information. The
advantages of gathering information in this fashion must be bal-
anced against any potential drawbacks, including endangering
civilians and peacekeepers or risking the success of other projects
(i.e., if a humanitarian organization responsible for caring for
40,000 people is likely to be expelled for issuing a public statement
about an isolated incident of abuse, then such action should not be
recommended). In the absence of other reliable information-gath-
ering mechanisms, the UN must work to fill the gap. The Security
Council performed this function when it established an interna-
tional commission of inquiry into the Darfur crisis, which was
largely responsible for convincing the Council to refer the crisis to
the ICC in 2005. Today, there are more than 40 UN human rights
officers working in Darfur. 
Related to the issue of gathering and disseminating quality
information is determining where discussions about the interna-
tional community’s response to a humanitarian crisis should begin.
The ICISS and UN reports both recognize that the Security
Council must be involved in any decision regarding humanitarian
intervention. Yet broader discussions concerning human rights
abuses and the implemention of R2P can occur in different venues
at the same time. The Human Rights Council, as the UN’s premier
human rights body, should also play a key role. When the Human
Rights Council held a special session on Darfur from December
12–13, 2006, it adopted a resolution for a high-level mission to
investigate the crisis and report back to the next session of the
Human Rights Council, which will take place from March 12 to
April 5, 2007. Provided it receives government consent to visit, the
mission’s findings and recommendations, as well as the follow-up
response of states, may be critical to Darfuris and to the credibility
of the Council as a whole.
Depoliticizing R2P mechanisms requires that the UN be held
accountable for its actions, display political transparency, and
widely disseminate accurate information about its intentions and
goals in Sudan. But this is not an easy task. As noted, Sudan offi-
cials called into question both the intention and composition of a
potential UN peacekeeping force. In media statements and
speeches, Sudanese state officials portrayed peacekeepers as tools
for regime change and Western occupation. Yet the UN has main-
tained over and over that a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur
would only arrive with Sudan’s consent, and it seems under current
conditions that any UN peacekeeping force would be composed
largely of troops from non-western countries. Challenging the gov-
ernment’s propaganda is a feasible approach at the international
level and with some sectors of the educated public in Sudan. The
thousands of uneducated proxy fighters and soldiers who are fight-
ing the Darfur war for the government are, however, more easily
convinced by their government and state media than by compet-
ing information campaigns. Moreover, the UN puts itself into a
difficult political position if it starts informing the public about the
composition of a UN peacekeeping force that Sudan has not
authorized and is adamantly against. 
The success of the R2P doctrine will ultimately be based 
on UN member states identifying and supporting the correct 
pressure points and incentives to end humanitarian and human
rights crises. These must provide both short-term remedies and
sustainable peace. As revealed by the conflict in Darfur, states 
and intergovernmental bodies that endorse the R2P doctrine are
falling short of their commitments when they rely time and again
on hollow threats that have little or no impact. Moreover, the 
R2P doctrine will greatly benefit from mechanisms that can pro-
vide credible and strong analytical information. Reliable informa-
tion gathered by civil society, national and international NGOs,
UN human rights officers, and other UN agencies is mandatory
for the legitimization of any international response. Finally, 
these international responses must be transparent, subject to 
oversight, and free from politicization and propaganda to the best
of their ability.
Conclusion
When states place their national sovereign rights above
human rights, experts correctly point out that the two are not
mutually exclusive and, in fact, that human rights are both legal
responsibilities binding on sovereigns and are in states’ best inter-
est. Sudan has not embraced this stance and still regards human
rights and human rights activists as threats to its national security
and stability. 
The R2P doctrine critically contributes to the legitimacy of
the UN in addressing widespread and systematic human rights
abuses. Yet as this paper argues, the doctrine is still developing and
reflects a consensus that exists more in principle than in practice.
As both R2P reports indicate, the doctrine’s status as customary
international norm has not crystallized, though it may be emerg-
ing as such. There are multiple and significant reasons for this slow
progress. What is especially critical at this moment, both for
Darfur and for the R2P doctrine, is for states to recognize their
fundamental responsibilities to respond to atrocities outside 
their territory. In the case of Darfur, hollow threats are chipping
away at the fragile legitimacy of the R2P doctrine. Especially at 
a time when forceful UN humanitarian intervention is very diffi-
cult to mobilize, what is needed is new thinking about how to
pressure obstinate governments through effective diplomacy and
UN sanctions. HRB
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